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Modeling Rational Agents: From Interwar Economics To Early Modern Game 
Theory, Nicola Giocoli. Edward Elgar, 2003, x + 464 pages1. 
 
The fame of Modeling Rational Agents precedes it.  Nicola Giocoli’s book 
won the Best Monograph prize, 2004, from the European Society for the 
History of Economic Thought, and – in an earlier manifestation as his doctoral 
thesis – the Joseph Dorfman Best Dissertation Award, 2002, from the History 
of Economics Society.  It does not disappoint the expectations thus aroused.  
Giocoli’s account is powerful and fascinating, and elegantly presented.   
 
Giocoli starts by suggesting that we can distinguish between the body of 
knowledge and the image of knowledge of a discipline, and that the two 
interpenetrate and interact.  The body concerns the theoretical and empirical 
knowledge acquired by the discipline, as well as its methods and open 
questions.  The image concerns what the discipline thinks it is and should be, 
how it presents and justifies itself, both to itself and to the world.  Giocoli’s 
thesis is that over, very roughly, the century from the 1890s to the 1980s, a 
transformation took place in the image of neoclassical economics, 
accompanied by corresponding changes in its body.  The image change that 
Giocoli identifies is from a ‘system of forces’ (SOF) to a ‘system of relations’ 
(SOR) view of what economics is about.  According to the SOF view the 
focus of analysis is on the economic processes generated by market and non-
market forces, including, but not limited to, those leading towards equilibrium.  
The SOR image, in contrast, focuses on studying the properties and 
implications of the logically possible existence of an equilibrium, ignoring the 
processes required to generate and underpin it.  This change in focus, he 
argues, is accompanied by a change in the discipline’s understanding of 
rationality, from one that stresses optimising behaviour, to a more rarefied  
notion of logical consistency.   
 
The focus of this story is a particular puzzle, namely the failure of neoclassical 
economics to adopt game theory, and, in particular, the concept of Nash 
equilibrium, in the immediate post-war period, given the present-day 
consensus that Nash equilibrium embodies the discipline’s most fundamental 
idea.  The answer that Giocoli gives is that game theory and Nash equilibrium 
were ideas whose time had not yet come.  Only once the transformation of the 
dominant self-image of economics from SOF to SOR had been completed, and 
the consistency approach to rationality displaced the older view, based on the 
maximisation of a utility function, was neoclassical economics ready to hear 
what the game theorists were saying.   
 
The book consist of two parts, articulated by an ‘interlude’, and each 
consisting of two chapters, plus an introduction and conclusion.  The 
introduction sets out the thesis just described, and then outlines mathematical 
formalism from Hilbert to Bourbaki, and the logical positivism of the Vienna 
Circle.  These constitute the ‘humus’ in which two trends germinate – a trend 
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within economics from Fisher, Pareto and Slutsky to Hicks, Allen and 
Samuelson, via Hayek, the Swedish school and Hutchison, and a mathematical 
trend exemplified by von Neumann and Morgenstern, and John Nash.   
 
The first part of the book discusses neoclassical attempts to escape from 
psychology (chapter 2) and perfect foresight (chapter 3).  These, respectively, 
refer to the projects of freeing economic agents of any dependency on ‘mental 
variables’ and psychological processes, and of relaxing the classical 
requirement of perfect knowledge on the part of agents for the achievement of 
an intertemporal equilibrium of the system as a whole.  Giocoli argues that the 
two projects were inconsistent and led to a stalemate lasting from the late 
1930s until well after World War II, which was resolved only by the 
replacement of the SOF by the SOR approach as the dominant self-image of 
economics.   
 
The second part of the book discusses von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
(chapter 4), and then Nash’s (chapter 5), versions of game theory, and 
explores the puzzle, indicated above, of the fall and subsequent rise of game 
theory and Nash equilibrium in the post-war period.  In a sub-plot to this 
account, Giocoli examines the writings of von Neumann, Morgenstern and 
Nash to see where they stood on the SOF-SOR issue – and finds an 
ambivalence with some strong evidence of a preference for the SOF version.  
This leads to the intriguing counterfactual speculation as to what might have 
happened had their contributions been sold vigorously to the profession as 
embodying an SOF vision.  Neoclassical economics might, he suggests, have 
found an alternative resolution to the crisis of the SOF view which did not lead 
to a victory of SOR. 
 
In the remainder of this review, I would like to do two things, both prompted 
by the observation that, remarkably, a book dealing with the evolution of the 
discipline of economics from the interwar period to the 1980s has nothing to 
say about Keynes.  Firstly, the contrast between the SOF and SOR versions of 
equilibrium is not the whole story: there is a significant alternative to both that 
Giocoli ignores.  Secondly, I wish to argue that Giocoli’s account is also 
incomplete in another respect: he neglects macroeconomics, and once this is 
considered the resolution of the SOF-SOR rivalry looks different in important 
ways.  These suggested extensions to Modeling Rational Agents are 
themselves a testament to the power and fruitfulness of Giocoli's approach.   
 
I want now to turn to a consideration of a central theme of the book, namely, 
the neoclassical concept of equilibrium.  Both SOR and SOF views embody 
notions of equilibrium, but, according to Giocoli, in the SOF image the focus 
is on ‘the explanation of how and why a certain equilibrium has been reached’, 
in contrast to the SOR image, the goal of which is the demonstration of the 
existence of an equilibrium, though (in Hutchison’s words) ‘not of [its] actual, 
empirical existence but of [its] conceivable, logically or mathematically non-
contradictory “existence”’ (p. 5) 
 
Giocoli identifies the principal theme of the development of economics in the 




“the last important attempt to preserve, if not enhance, the traditional 
image of economics as a discipline dealing with systems of forces, that 
is, as a discipline which investigates the actual working of the 
economic system and, in particular, its equilibrating processes … [T]he 
key theoretical issues became the modeling of the disequilibrium 
processes … The program developed inside a more general theme, that 
of turning the static neoclassical equilibrium theory into a dynamic 
one.”  (pp. 135-6) 
 
The SOF view was thus a view of economics as the study of the working of 
the economic system: the investigation of the equilibrating processes 
spontaneously invoked when the system was out of equilibrium.  Giocoli 
argues that this attempt to draw dynamics from the static equilibrium theory 
was unsuccessful, partly because of ‘unavoidable inconsistencies between the 
willingness to investigate the disequilibrium behavior of the economic system 
and the desire to preserve the notion of equilibrium as the central category of 
the analysis’ (p. 137).   
 
Giocoli touches here on some of the key issues concerning the way the 
equilibrium concept has been deployed in the neoclassical mainstream.  Two 
things, I think, are clear from his account.  Firstly, even the SOF version 
implies that the economic system can be understood as an equilibrium: the 
image of the economy as a whole is one of a static equilibrium, the 
maintenance of which is explained by the operation of equilibrating forces, 
forces which only operate once the equilibrium has been disturbed by 
exogenous forces.  This leaves us with a profoundly static and ahistorical 
image of society: there is no theoretical basis here for immanent development 
or novelty.  The recognition that the model might not be entirely adequate is 
addressed not by replacing it with an alternative, but by adding dynamics on to 
the static core, notably by relaxing the perfect information assumption and 
introducing various models of learning and expectations adjustment.   
 
Secondly, the SOR version is clearly significantly worse, focusing the entire 
attention of the researchers involved on the study of theoretically conceivable 
equilibrium states, divorced from any possibility of learning about the 
equilibrating processes which might lead to and sustain such states.  This, I 
submit, cuts us off from all possibility of learning about the forces which 
actually underpin and shape our society. 
 
But there is an alternative to both.  Throughout the history of modern 
economics there has been struggle, sometimes open, sometimes hidden, 
between two notions of equilibrium.   
 
In the neoclassical view, an economic system is at or near a normal state or 
condition such that small moves away from it set in motion forces returning 
the system to the attractor state.  The system can be modelled as an 
equilibrium.  For some purposes, the equilibrium can simply be assumed to 
hold.  If greater detail is required, a distinction can be made between a short 
and long run: in the long run, the system may be considered as, at least 
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approximately, or for practical purposes, in the attractor state; in the short run, 
firstly, changes in exogenous variables shock the system away from the 
attractor state, and then divergence of the system from the attractor state itself 
sets in motion forces returning it to its normal condition.  
 
In the alternative to this view, self-organising economic systems exhibit 
stability underpinned by a host of adaptive mechanisms, that is, they are 
homeostatic.  The terms homeostasis and equilibrium are often used 
interchangeably, but the notion of equilibrium here is fundamentally different 
from the neoclassical concept.  In the ‘years of high theory’ prior to World 
War II, the neoclassical paradigm was challenged by the emergence from 
within itself of a number of standpoints which began to undermine the static 
notion of equilibrium.  Two of the most notable challengers were Keynes and 
Hayek.  In works such as the Sensory Order and Law, Legislation and Liberty 
Hayek refers with approval to the notions of homeostasis and open systems in 
the writings of Bertalanffy and others.   
 
“In order to explain the economic aspects of large social systems, we 
have to account for the course of a flowing stream, constantly adapting 
itself as a whole to changes in circumstances … and not for a 
hypothetical state of equilibrium” (Hayek, F.A. Law Legislation and 
Liberty, Routledge, 1982, III: 159).   
 
Keynes’s General Theory, amongst other things, reintroduced many of Marx’s 
insights, including the notion that the accumulation of capital over time must 
lead to a tendential fall in the rate of profit.  Equilibrium here can only be a 
temporary halting place, an abstraction from the real flow, an assumption of 
ceteris paribus purely for analytical tractability.   
 
What these paradigms are groping towards is a view in which time, change 
and history are fundamental, in opposition to the neoclassical view that 
equilibrium is the default, and disequilibrium a temporary disturbance which 
will spontaneously eliminate itself.  In the former vision equilibrium is a 
temporary, short-run state in which growth and evolution are counterfactually 
assumed to be suspended.  This temporary, provisional equilibrium is destined 
to be disrupted by the emergence of endogenous forces in the longer run.  In 
the latter, neoclassical, view, stasis is the permanent, underlying condition, 
dynamics only arising temporarily after an exogenous shock, in the transition 
to a new equilibrium.   
 
Giocoli’s concern is to distinguish an earlier and a later phase of neoclassical 
economics and to account for the transition, while pointing up the deficiencies 
of the later SOR standpoint with respect to the earlier SOF view.  My view, 
however, sketched out above, is that both the SOR and SOF images manifest a 
fundamental weakness intrinsic to the neoclassical outlook, namely the static 
neoclassical concept equilibrium.  The alternative, which was already 
emerging at the time, and which it was important to render heterodox, was the 
movement towards understanding the economy as a system – a general theory, 
as Keynes says, is ‘concerned with the behaviour of the economic system as a 
whole’ (The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Macmillan, 
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1973, xxxii) – and, as Hayek argues, towards replacing equilibrium with 
homeostasis.     
 
Turning now to the second of the two points I wished to raise, I’d like briefly 
to touch on the insights we might gain by supplementing Giocoli’s account 
with a consideration of macroeconomics.  By concentrating entirely on 
microeconomic fields such as general equilibrium theory, Giocoli’s account 
misses the retention of the SOF image postwar within macroeconomics and 
econometrics.  Following the aborted Keynesian revolution of the 1930s, 
academic economics and policy making circles were colonised by a 
bowdlerised neoclassical Keynesianism, and, subsequently, by an equally 
neoclassical monetarism.  The period saw the radical separation of micro- and 
macro-economics (a separation denoted, paradoxically, as a ‘neoclassical 
synthesis’).   
 
In Giocoli's account it is difficult to understand why SOR should have 
triumphed over SOF.  It is clear from Giocoli’s account that the SOF paradigm 
did not founder because it was eclipsed by SOR: on the contrary, although 
SOF was in trouble from the end of the 1930s, as the attempted escapes from 
psychology and perfect foresight produced opposing results – one leading 
away from, and the other towards, including agent learning – it was not until 
the 1980s that SOR was established as the core of the neoclassical standpoint, 
allowing the rediscovery of game theory and Nash equilibrium.  So what 
drove this process?  Why did it become untenable for economists to present 
themselves as following an SOF image, and why did they feel they had to 
switch to the SOR programme?   
 
This makes more sense once we understand that, with the growth of 
neoclassical macroeconomics and econometrics, the SOF view was retained 
unchallenged in the postwar period.  The SOF and SOR were complementary: 
in micro, including general equilibrium theory, there was an increasing 
recourse to maths and logic, and stress on the investigation of what it would 
mean for the individual agent to exhibit rationality, while in macro and 
econometrics, including neoclassical Keynesianism, and monetarism, there 
was little interest in the rationality or otherwise of the individual agent, since it 
was aggregate behaviours that were the focus of concern.  Macroeconomics 
was interested in disequilibrium behaviour: how would agents respond to 
shocks while they were still learning about them?  This was needed to 
underpin the development and use of fiscal and monetary policy for economic 
stabilisation.  Microeconomics could be presented as attempting to supply 
rigorous foundations for this by explaining exactly what agent rationality 
meant, and what it would mean for the economy to be in equilibrium.  The two 
strands come together again with the emergence of the New Classical 
Macroeconomics (NCM) in the 1970s.  Macro was then ready to accept games 
theory and use it, but by then games theory was no longer purely SOR, as 
Binmore and others point out.  NCM attempted to build models which were 
internally consistent but which mimicked the progress of the economy.  As 
Lucas makes clear in Models of Business Cycles, the focus of interest of the 
NCM was still the teasing out of dynamics from an equilibrium model, but 
now using the formalism of dynamic games theory.  Although the NCM 
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makes no attempt to discuss the behaviour of the economy in disequilibrium, it 
attempts to dynamicise the model by incorporating exogenous shocks and then 
using game theory to model how agents will react to them, while invoking 
continuous Nash equilibrium conditions.  It thus considerably expands the 
notion of equilibrium, calling on it to do much of the work done by 
disequilibrium in earlier schools of macroeconomic thought.  It is thus 
problematic to fit the NCM into the pure SOR framework.   
 
The budding off of a microeconomics moving towards SOR, while leaving an 
SOF macro untouched, made explicit what was already implicit in SOF, given 
the reductionist neoclassical strategy of basing everything on the individual 
optimising agent, set in a static social world, instead of the evolution of 
systems of relations between agents, as the systems theoretical vision would 
have done.  Then, clearly, much work had to be done establishing the nature of 
this agent and the nature of the equilibrium constituting the minimal 
institutional framework within which these agents were to interact.  The most 
stripped-down notion of the agent is one in which we know nothing of his 
desires, except that he pursues them consistently, and the most stripped-down 
social context is the Nash equilibrium in which everyone is behaving self-
consistently, given self-consistent behaviour of everyone else.  
 
I think this fascinating and provocative work can productively be linked to 
Mary Poovey’s History of the Modern Fact (University of Chicago Press, 
1998).  The latter is an ‘epistemological history’ of political economy, a 
history of the ways political economists have sought to persuade, themselves 
and others, that what they are producing is reliable knowledge.  Various 
phases of political economy are characterised, according to Poovey, by the 
metaphors and tropes, the rhetorical strategies which form, not only the 
language in which economics is communicated, but also the self-image of the 
discipline and hence the practice of economics itself.  Without mentioning 
Poovey, this is precisely Giocoli’s approach.  SOF and SOR may both be 
understood rhetorically, as strategies to persuade us that economics is worth 
doing and the pronouncements of its practitioners worthy of attention.  Both 
suffer from the perennial problem of the social sciences: the need to underpin 
their claim to the status of science, and both do so by reference to, and a claim 
to share the prestige of, a non-social science – in the case of SOF this is 
classical mechanics with its associated differential calculus, for SOR 
mathematical formalism, combinatorics and set theory.  To set this out 
explicitly raises interesting questions for further research, but to have set the 




City University, London, and CPNSS, LSE 
 
 
Word count: 2954. 
